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I. INTRODUCTION
The telephone industry in the United States started with the Bell
patent in 1878. Telephones were introduced into many communities during
the next twenty years. After the Bell patents expired, around the turn of the
century, multiple telephone companies began operations in many cities. In
many cases, these companies did not even interconnect, so people needed
two or three telephone services in order to be in contact with all of their

* Joseph H. Weber is a telecommunications engineer with over 50 years of
experience, mostly at AT&T and Bell Labs. Between 1980 and 1984, he held the position of
Director of Technical Regulatory Planning, with responsibility for the technical aspects of
all of AT&T's legal, regulatory, and legislative activities in the federal arena. In this role, he
was the sole AT&T technical representative during the development of the MFJ, He
subsequently led the development of the principles underpinning the division of assets
between AT&T and the Bell Operating Companies and oversaw the actual division of assets
process. After divestiture, he left AT&T and became a consultant, focusing on the technical
issues related to telecommunications policy and regulation in the United States and abroad.
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friends and customers. This chaotic situation also caused the carriers great
financial difficulty.
In 1907, Theodore Vail, having been installed as president of AT&T
after the "Panic of 1907," proposed that telephone service in the United
States be provided based on the philosophy of "one system, one policy,
universal service."' This concept involved monopoly provision of service,
coupled with pervasive government oversight and regulation. It was
promoted in advertisements from 1908 and formalized in the so-called
Kingsbury Commitment of 1913,2 when AT&T was allowed to operate
without governmental interference, but agreed to stop acquiring telephone
companies and to interconnect with others.
The Bell System followed that idea for half a century, fully
integrating its systems and procedures to provide end-to-end service. In
order to ensure a reliable supply of standardized equipment, it also
designed and manufactured its own equipment. Bell Laboratories (Bell
Labs)--created from a merger of the design department of the
manufacturer, Western Electric, and the engineering department of the
operator, AT&T-also embarked on an extensive and successful effort to
perform the research necessary to promote technological progress in
telecommunications.
Using this model, AT&T successfully expanded telephone service in
the United States until the 1950s, when universal service was essentially
achieved. During this period, the concept of "service" was the predominant
value within the organization, becoming almost a religion. "Independent"
telephone companies, mostly in rural areas, were made partners in the
system, encouraged by generous "settlement" payments from long-distance
service.

II. THE RISE OF COMPETITION
Starting in the 1960s, new technologies, many pioneered at Bell Labs,
were stimulating competitive activities. There were four principal
technologies that led to this: (1) large radio systems for carrying longdistance calls; (2) semiconductor devices built for computers that could be
used for switches; (3) miniature connectors for telephones and other
1. See AT&T, 1907 Annual Report (1908); see also MILTON L. MUELLER, JR.,
UNIVERSAL SERVICE: COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION, AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF

THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM 4 (1996).

2. What is commonly referred to as the Kingsbury Commitment is a compilation of
three letters memorializing an agreement between AT&T Vice President N.C. Kinsbury and
Attorney General J.C. McReynolds. See LETTER FROM AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH
Co. To ATTORNEY GENERAL, OUTLINING A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH IT HAS BEEN
DETERMINED UPON; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPLY; [AND] PRESIDENT'S LETrER TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL (Dept. of Justice, 1914).
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terminal equipment; and (4) tone signaling, that allowed signals to be sent
over the network after a connection was established.
Regulators, intent on limiting the rate of growth of the Bell System,
tended to allow competitive entrance into various portions of the market,
albeit slowly and unevenly. Competition began in the following areas:
* Large companies began building their own private microwave
systems for internal communications;
* Telecommunications equipment manufacturers began building
terminal equipment and customer switches that could be
connected to the telephone network;
* Other manufacturers began trying, with some success, to sell
equipment to the Bell companies; and
* MCI built a long-distance network using microwave radio
systems, allowing people to make local calls to MCI's switches,
and complete the calls by using tone signaling to get the necessary
information to the MCI network. Others followed.
The last development was not based on new technology so much as
on pricing distortions that had grown up over the years. For many years,
technological advances had benefited long-distance services more than
local services. In order to maintain the stability of local pricing, longdistance prices were allowed to remain well above cost, the difference
being used to reduce the cost of local service. MCI's idea exploited this
arrangement. It used its own long-distance network and paid Bell only the
subsidized price for local access.
Bell objected furiously, guided in part by their sense of "service" and
partly by financial considerations, but in a series of FCC and court
decisions, Bell was gradually forced to give ground in a number of areas.
Terminal equipment-telephones, customer switches, etc.-was
deregulated. Bell had strongly defended its "end-to-end service" mantra,
but a series of FCC decisions (Hush-A-Phone3 and Carterfone4) weakened
its position. It became apparent that customer-owned terminal equipment
could be connected to the network without service degradation. The FCC
finally adopted a set of interconnection standards and deregulated the
provision of terminal equipment. Competition developed quickly, spurring
innovation in that market. As a precursor of things to come, controversies
quickly developed as to the location of the "network interface" where
equipment was regulated on one side, and deregulated on the other side.

3. The FCC's initial order in the Hush-A-Phone matter is discussed in Hush-a-Phone
Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
4. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, Decision, 13
F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
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This definition became increasingly difficult as more complex services
evolved.
AT&T agreed to connect to MCI, and other long-distance carriers
(e.g., Sprint). After strenuous complaints by AT&T and several court
rulings, the FCC ordered MCI and others to pay the so-called Exchange
Network Facilities for Interstate Access (ENFIA) rates for local access.
These prices were higher than basic phone rates, but included less than half
of the subsidy that AT&T's long-distance services contributed to local
service.
Other manufacturers began to sell equipment to the Bell telephone
companies. AT&T and Western Electric management attempted to
suppress this, but some local Bell managers bought equipment from other
manufacturers when they thought it superior to Western's.
In addition, data communications began to increase in importance.
The line between computers and communications became increasingly
blurred, but AT&T was prohibited from providing computer services by a
1956 consent decree.5 The FCC kept trying to draw bright lines between
computers and communications without much success. In a series of
ComputerInquiries,6 the FCC attempted to distinguish between "basic" and
"enhanced" services, regulating the former and deregulating the latter.
Despite many years of effort, these definitions were impossible to
implement in a workable way. The major result was to prevent Bell from
offering services that had "enhanced" components.
III. THE ANTITRUST SUIT
In 1973, the Federal government filed a lawsuit alleging that AT&T
had: (1) illegally limited the kinds of connections and services MCI and
others could get, and (2) illegally prevented other manufacturers from
selling equipment to Bell companies.
The lawsuit wended its way through the legal system while all of the
activities mentioned above were taking place, and finally came to trial in
1981. It should be noted that the allegation dealt principally with
equipment provision and access for long-distance services, which were
deemed competitive. The local exchange monopoly was recognized and
accepted. The lawsuit was not intended to change that. In fact, the initial
5. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 68,246 (D.N.J.
1956).
6. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communication Services and Facilities, Final Decisionand Order,28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1970);
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), Order, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980); Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104
F.C.C.2d 958 (1986).
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settlement agreement (referred to as a Modification of Final Judgment, or
"MFJ ''7, which harkened back to the 1956 consent decree) attempted to
draw a bright line between monopoly and competitive services, the former
of which were to remain regulated, while the latter would be removed from
regulatory oversight.
AT&T followed standard practice in dealing with the lawsuit,
dragging it out with endless filings and hearings.8 When Judge Harold
Greene took over the case, he vowed to move it along, and he did.
What were AT&T's alternatives?
1. Fight the case to the end. If AT&T lost any significant part of
the suit, it could lead to ruinous private litigation. AT&T
initially did fight the case in court, but after comments by Judge
Greene in response to a petition for dismissal in the summer of
1981, the company realized it probably could not prevail in
court, and began to think about settlement.
2. Agree to some kind of injunctive relief that would have saddled
AT&T with significant operational constraints. The injunctive
relief scenarios proposed by the Department of Justice were so
restrictive that the operations people at AT&T did not think that
they could properly operate the business.
3. Give up Western Electric. This involved giving up most of Bell
Labs, widely (if incorrectly) viewed as the crown jewel of the
empire. Also, this did not solve the problem of MCI and longdistance competition. Finally, this was prominent in the minds
of AT&T management, as it did not relieve AT&T of the
restrictions from the 1956 consent decree preventing it from
entering the computer business. They somehow believed that the
computer business was the key to AT&T's future, and that Bell
Labs technology would allow them to become a major force in
the industry.
4. Split off the monopoly telephone companies from the
competitive long-distance and manufacturing businesses
(divestiture), with the following implications, some positive and
some negative:
0 Telephone service might be severely disrupted, which
might take years to sort out and resolve. This loomed
large in the minds of management and operations
people who had spent their entire careers overseeing an
7. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
8. The Justice Department did its part here, as well, requesting information that
required boxcars full of paper to provide.
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integrated entity, and who placed great importance on
service quality;
* AT&T would be freed from a restrictive consent
decree dating from 1956, and would be allowed to
enter the computer business;
* The local telephone companies would be prevented
from offering long-distance services, so local and longdistance services could be effectively separated; and
* AT&T's long-distance services would be deregulated.
Obviously, alternative four was chosen. A number of difficult
administrative, technical, and operational problems needed to be addressed
and resolved.
A particularly difficult technical problem was defining the connection
point between the long-distance and local companies. As in the case of
terminal equipment deregulation, any conceptual line often ran through the
middle of a piece of equipment, such as a switch. The long-distance
companies wanted to be able to connect their lines to a so-called "Class 4"
toll office, where their traffic could be concentrated before being delivered
to the local telephone switch. AT&T asserted that these "Class 4" offices
were the heart and soul of the long-distance network, and stripping AT&T
of these assets would make it impossible for it to operate a long-distance
network.9 The negotiations over the consent decree almost broke down
over this issue, and it was finally resolved in AT&T's favor.
The number of regional companies needed to be determined. The MFJ
did not specify this. If there were too few, it was feared AT&T would be
accused of retaining its monopoly. If too many, the resulting entities might
be too small to operate effectively. The balance was struck at seven. In the
end it turned out to be too many, since subsequent mergers have reduced it
to three.
The size and makeup of the local service areas-Local Access and
Transport Areas (LATAs)-had to be determined. If they were too large,
insufficient scope was left for the long-distance carriers, including AT&T.
If they were too small, the local networks of the telephone companies
would be disrupted.
Ownership of common switching and transmission systems needed to
be determined according to rules that had yet to be developed. Much
equipment was shared. It had to be assigned to one company and partially
leased to the other, a particularly difficult task if competitive neutrality was
to be maintained for long-distance carriers. All parties were very intent on
9. The underlying problem, which the lawyers negotiating the decree did not
understand, was that in a fully integrated network, almost every toll switch was in part a
"Class 4" and provided both toll switching and access to local switches.

Number 1]

THE BELL SYSTEM DIVESTITURE

owning as many assets as possible even though in some cases they did not
need them all.
The local network switches had to be reconfigured to accommodate
carriers. This reconfiguration involved
multiple interexchange
accommodating a different dialing plan, or allowing customers to prespecify their interexchange carrier and routing the calls appropriately.
Accomplishing reconfiguration required substantial software modifications
to the electronic switches that served eighty percent of Bell's customers.
The other twenty percent, still served by older electromechanical switches,
could not access other interexchange carriers (except by using the old dialup mode) until the switches were replaced.
Billing arrangements needed to be devised so that the local companies
could bill AT&T's customers for long-distance services (as they had
always done) without competitive disadvantage to other long-distance
carriers.
Private line provisioning had always been done cooperatively
between local telephone companies and AT&T Long Lines. After
divestiture, this relationship needed to be formalized. This was the first
major failure; it took a year for private line provisioning to return to an
acceptable process.
The planning took two years, and divestiture may well have cost the
$20 billion that AT&T had been saying it would when defending the suit,
but by then, who was counting?
IV. NEAR-TERM RESULTS
The conceptual framework envisioned in the MFJ did not survive the
implementation of divestiture for very long. The monopoly/competitive
distinction broke down almost immediately. Yellow Pages and cellular
telephone service, both competitive businesses, were assigned to the
"monopoly" telephone companies. This happened because the perception in
the minds of most people at the time, including Judge Greene, was that
AT&T had the better of the deal, and the local companies had been shortchanged. The assignment of Yellow Pages and cellular to the local
companies was an attempt to even the scales.
AT&T retained its dominant position in the long-distance market,
albeit with declining market share. Despite the fact that long distance was
now competitive, the FCC retained its jurisdiction and continued to
regulate AT&T.
Nevertheless, the separation was accomplished successfully. All
entities were able to operate and the American telecommunications system
still worked, except for private line installations, which took a year to
straighten out.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 61

The local telephone companies were not content to stay in the local
business and began agitating for relief almost immediately. They succeeded
with the Telecommunications Act of 1996,10 where they traded their local
monopoly for permission to enter the long-distance market." Under the
Act, access pricing was to be "cost-based," setting the stage for years of
controversy as to just what that meant.
V. LONGER-TERM RESULTS
After the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the FCC struggled mightily
to force competition into the local markets by requiring the local Bell
companies to lease their lines to others at regulated low prices. This effort
ultimately failed, as might have been foreseen. Any arrangement that
requires a provider of goods or services to rely on a competitor whose
prices are arbitrarily set by a regulator at levels that the competitor believes
are below cost is not a recipe that can long survive.
AT&T failed in its attempts to enter the computer market. It tried
desperately, first by developing its own product, based on controllers that
had been designed for telephone switching systems, and then by several illconceived acquisitions. It squandered billions of dollars on these ventures,
under the misapprehension that its allegedly superior technology would
overcome its lack of understanding of the computer market.
New technologies, in the form of digital cable systems and cellular
services, ultimately provided effective competition in local markets.
Long-distance service was not viable as a stand-alone business. The
long-distance carriers were ultimately absorbed by the local telephone
companies, which also merged with each other. The original seven
Regional Bell Operating Companies combined to form three companies
(two large and one small).
The manufacturing arm of AT&T was unable to succeed without its
captive telephone company market. Part of the reason was that the local
telephone companies increasingly viewed AT&T as a competitor (which it
was) and were reluctant to buy equipment from it. Finally, the unit was
split off as Lucent Technologies.
Enormous investments were made, and much money lost, in building
excess long-distance transmission capacity using fiber-optic cables.
Technological changes made the conventional switching systems
manufactured by the giant telecommunications equipment companies
obsolete. The result of these forces was that Lucent Technologies and other
10. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2000)).
11. As should have been foreseen, this was a bad deal for them. The crown jewels of
the Bell system were not Bell Labs-they were the local monopolies.
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major telecommunications equipment companies found their main
businesses disappearing. As of this writing, it is not clear how many, if any,
of these companies will survive.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The telecommunications environment in the United States has been so
transformed by new services and technologies in the past twenty-five years
as to be almost unrecognizable. It is, on balance, competitive and many
new services have appeared. It is likely, however, that had divestiture never
happened, the industry would have landed in much the same place:
" Terminal equipment, which could clearly be supplied
competitively and easily connected to the network, had been
deregulated and became competitive before divestiture;
* Manufacturing has been decimated by competition and
technological changes unrelated to divestiture. AT&T, which had
retained control of its captive manufacturer, was ultimately
obliged to spin it off for business reasons;
" Long-distance services have become almost free, thanks to lowcost fiber-optic transmission systems;
* Local competition for basic telephone service is thriving, based
on technologies that barely existed in 1982 (digital cellular and
voice over IP on cable);
* Data communications has finally become a significant market,
thanks to the Internet; and
* Video services are no longer separate from telecommunications,
and are now fully part of the mix.
Every one of these changes happened as a result of technological
change, not organizational rearrangement (although some regulatory
changes would have been necessary to allow them to develop). Two of the
three remaining Bell Operating Companies offer a full range of services,
including wireless and high-speed Internet access, and are rapidly
deploying equipment that will allow them to provide video services as well,
putting them in full competition with the cable companies. Wireless
services are also dominated by the two large Bell Operating Companies,
now called AT&T and Verizon.
The national telecommunications organizational structure now
involves more services than wireline telephony (Internet access, wireless,
and video) and is essentially a duopoly instead of a monopoly. It has
several regional companies on both sides, and manufacturing is not
controlled by any of the service providers. The amount of regulation is
significantly reduced, as most markets are now thought of as competitive.

30

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 61

The penetration of high-speed Internet access, although still growing, lags
behind a number of other countries.
For all that, an enormous amount of money and effort was spent:
operationally, on modifying the telephone network; administratively, on
lawyers and consultants in regulatory proceedings and lawsuits; and
financially, in investments that ultimately failed to deliver a return. All of
this for little long term benefit. Perhaps, as a nation, we should think long
and hard before imposing government-sponsored restructuring on major
industries, even for apparently laudable objectives.

